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 n taking up the topic of cybernetics in 1955, a field then ex-
 erting influence on everything from telecommunications to
 public health management (see Heims), Jacques Lacan proposed
 the rubric of "conjectural sciences" for all those sciences of combi-
 nation, where "[w]hat's at issue is the place, and what does or
 doesn't come to fill it, something then which is strictly equivalent
 to its own inexistence" (Seminar, Book II 299). This "science of the
 combination of places as such" is, to be sure, distinct from the exact
 sciences, which always focus on "what is found at the same place"
 (299). The exact sciences, in other words, deal with positivities,
 the conjectural sciences with probabilities. It is, indeed, to Pascal's
 arithmetic triangle that Lacan turns when he wishes to trace the
 origins of this science of combinations: "If this is how we locate
 cybernetics, we will easily find it ancestors, Condorcet, for instance,
 with his theory of votes and coalitions, of parties, as he says, and
 further back again Pascal, who would be its father, and its true
 point of origin" (296).
 Several years earlier, in Cybernetics (a book with which Lacan
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 was familiar) mathematician Norbert Wiener had also reached
 back to the 17th century in tracing the genealogy of cybernetics:
 If I had to choose a patron saint for cybernetics out of the
 history of science, I should have to choose Leibniz. The philos-
 ophy of Leibniz centers about two closely related concepts-
 that of a universal symbolism and that of a calculus of reason-
 ing. From these are descended the mathematical notation and
 the symbolic logic of the present day.... Indeed, Leibniz, like
 his predecessor Pascal, was interested in the construction of
 computing machines in the metal. It is therefore not in the
 least surprising that the same intellectual impulse which has
 led to the development of mathematical logic has at the same
 time led to the ideal or actual mechanization of processes of
 thought. (12)
 For Wiener, the development of cybernetics is a story of the power
 of formal and mathematical reason to introduce order and predic-
 tion into phenomena that do not behave in accord with Newtonian
 mechanics and temporality, that are not, as Lacan would say, ulti-
 mately always only where they are, "found at the same place" (Wie-
 ner 30-44). Lacan would agree with Wiener that the two sciences
 "are inseparable from one another" (Seminar, Book II 296) insofar
 as both rely on "the little letters" or pure signifiers which constitute
 an "ordered register" (299) of signification-the symbolic-that
 exists independently from, but renders cognitively accessible, the
 real.
 But Lacan is, not surprisingly, more interested finally in the
 differences between conjectural and exact sciences. The central
 difference turns on the object of the inquiry, rather than the
 method: as his allusion to Condorcet's theory of votes and coali-
 tions indicates, the conjectural sciences are fundamentally con-
 cerned with man-indeed, the rubric itself is meant to substitute
 for the "group of sciences normally designated by the term human
 sciences" (296). In this science of combinations, what "does or
 doesn't come to fill" its place is, at bottom, the human being, in all
 its various social and psychological itineraries. The terminological
 shift from "human science" to "conjectural science" would seem a
 purposive turn away from the subjective fascinations with human
 individuality: in making human beings subordinate to the "place"
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 they either do or do not come to fill, the conjectural sciences make
 man appear always under erasure, as it were, alternately material-
 izing and dematerializing, "strictly equivalent to [his] own inexis-
 tence" (299).
 The importance of what Lacan thus characterizes as the "con-
 jectural sciences" in the development of the social sciences can
 hardly be denied. Ian Hacking's The Taming of Chance, for example,
 demonstrates the crucial role, beginning in the 18th century, of
 probability and statistics in the management of social life.' In a
 slightly different register, Christopher Herbert has rooted the
 "ethnographic imagination" in a readiness to conceive of social re-
 ality as essentially relational, a matter less of positive entities, be
 they individuals or classes, than of combinations and patterns:
 what he calls the "culture concept," a "need to think of culture (in
 the sense of a complex whole) as the composite of relationships ex-
 isting among the phenomena of a given society" that goes back at
 least to the 18th century (10). Herbert provides a very interesting
 account of the transition from moral philosophy to political econ-
 omy, as exemplified in the career of Adam Smith. What makes this
 transition so fluid is that both moral philosophy and political econ-
 omy are essentially what Lacan calls "sciences of the combinations
 of the scanned encounter" (Seminar, Book II 300): that is, whether
 they deal with the complex sources of envy or deference, or the
 mysterious beneficence of economic competition, both inquiries
 extrapolate from an intersubjective matrix in which every calcula-
 tion must include within it the potential calculations of others.
 Thus it is that attempts by the social sciences to move beyond the
 dimension of the merely subjective or intersubjective seem none-
 theless to recur, intentionally or not, to the language and imagery
 of the human encounter: will the other show up or not? Lacan
 touches on this almost uncanny aspect of "man's waiting": "In the
 game of chance . . . [man] has the idea that something is revealed
 there, which belongs to him, and, I would say, all the more so given
 that no one is confronting him" (300). The conjectural sciences
 emerge as the precipitate from a waiting game.
 Sociologist Niklas Luhmann would describe the emergence
 of conjectural sciences out of the paradigm of the intersubjective
 encounter as the evolutionary drift of functional differentia-
 tion and, more specifically, as the differentiation of social systems
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 and interaction systems. Sometime in the second half of the 18th
 century, it no longer became possible to understand society as
 "interaction," as essentially a series of face-to-face encounters.
 Competition for Luhmann, to take a prominent example, "is a
 non-interactional way of relating to others" ("Evolutionary Differ-
 entiation" 118); that is, it expresses the idea that social relations
 continue to operate even without the immediate presence of oth-
 ers, and hence without all the codified gestures ofpolitesse and def-
 erence such presence normally requires. The economy becomes
 less "dependent upon rules of interaction," requiring instead an
 "understanding of [its] own structural conditions" (117). Economic
 thought becomes an abstract tracing of the movement of probable
 combinations. At the same time, however, this evolution toward a
 "structural understanding" of society was intimately linked to the
 vicissitudes of face-to-face "interaction": throughout the 17th and
 18th centuries a "new intensity of social reflexivity can be observed,
 of 'taking the role of the other"' (121). In this way, the "interaction
 system develops a combinatorial space of immense complexity,"
 which itself requires, as it were, the introduction of noninter-
 actional rules-"structural conditions"-to be managed. It is be-
 cause "no participant can know the state of a 'simple' two-person
 interaction system" (121), because of the phenomenological impasse
 of what Luhmann calls, following Parsons, "double contingency"
 (a phenomenon best exemplified historically by the endlessly self-
 defeating teaching of "sincerity" in 18th-century moral discourse)
 that interaction leads to, as its own surpassing or negation, a struc-
 tural understanding of society. As Luhmann remarks, "[t]he
 awareness of double contingencies autocatalyzes the development
 of social systems" (121). Social science, then, whether one under-
 stands it as the elaboration of "conjectural sciences" or as the result
 of the differentiation between society and interaction, finds itself,
 both historically and conceptually, in a kind of antagonism with a
 subjective or intersubjective substrate.
 This antagonism-or more gently, and less anthropomor-
 phically, this oscillation-between a formalized "structural under-
 standing" of the social and its subjective or intersubjective sub-
 strate received its most thoroughgoing consideration 30 years ago,
 in Michel Foucault's The Order of Things. While acknowledging the
 "double advance" of modern thought, "on the one hand towards
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 formalism in thought and on the other towards the discovery of
 the unconscious-towards Russell and Freud" (or towards Wiener
 and Lacan, we might add), Foucault also insists on a kind of in-
 ternal asymmetry to this coupling, an asymmetry glossed over in
 Lacan's and Wiener's genealogies. For although formalization as
 an ideal and a method may well link figures like Russell and Leib-
 niz, any consideration of their respective thinking about man is
 fundamentally skewed, suggests Foucault, if it does not recognize
 the appearance of the "positivity" of man toward the start of the
 19th century. Thus, even if it is "of interest historically to know
 how Condorcet was able to apply the calculation of probabilities to
 politics" or "how contemporary psychologists make use of informa-
 tion theory in order to understand the phenomena of learning,"
 such accounts of the thinking about man and his behavior must be
 tied to the historical recognition that the very appearance of man
 as an object of inquiry was made possible not by the extension but
 rather the "retreat of the mathesis" (Foucault 349). Rather than
 imagine a mere continuity with the Leibnizian project of a univer-
 sal symbolic language, Foucault suggests we view the human sci-
 ences as bounded on one surface only by the project of formaliza-
 tion. The human sciences do, indeed, "have the more or less
 deferred, but constant, aim of giving themselves, or in any case of
 utilizing ... a mathematical formalization." But they also touch on
 another edge the great empirical sciences Foucault unearths ar-
 chaeologically: "they proceed in accordance with models and con-
 cepts borrowed from biology, economics, the sciences of language"
 (347). Most importantly, however, the human sciences share a
 third surface with a philosophical problematic of finitude inas-
 much as "they address themselves to that being of man which phi-
 losophy is attempting to conceive at the level of radical finitude"
 (347).
 It is this last element in Foucault's extraordinarily intricate
 archaeology of the human sciences that may be said to be privi-
 leged in Foucault's own account. "Modern man ... is possible only
 as a figuration of finitude. Modern culture can conceive of man
 because it conceives of the finite on the basis of itself" (318). What
 this means is that "man," as an object of inquiry, as an epistemolog-
 ical "positivity," first becomes visible as limited, contingent, and
 partial. To be sure, there was thinking about human beings in ear-
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 lier epochs, and there was a kind of Olympian vantage assumed
 by the Classical episteme, a vantage from which all might be sur-
 veyed in representation, but that vantage was not theorized as the
 particular property of man. Indeed, man's very identity, the very
 thought of his specificity, only emerges, argues Foucault, out of a
 shift to what we would now call-after Saussure's signifiers have
 made it so famous-a regime of pure differentiality:
 It is apparent how modern reflection, as soon as the first shoot
 of this analytic [of finitude] appears, by-passes the display of
 representation, together with its culmination in the form of a
 table as ordered by Classical knowledge, and moves towards a
 certain thought of the Same-in which Difference is the Same
 thing as Identity. (315)
 Man, and with him the human sciences, emerges not as the peak
 of a pyramidal hierarchy of being and knowledge, but rather as
 the very locus of the difference between being and knowledge, the
 fissure and finitude from which issue all things-knowledge, man
 himself-in their varied and incommensurable identities.
 Contrary then to the caricature of "enlightenment human-
 ism," in which it is taken as an article of faith that optical meta-
 phors figure man's self-appointed sovereignty of the world, in "our
 humanism"-but what could the earlier humanisms be, that had
 no concept of man?-in "our humanism" man is divided against
 himself and all else besides: "Man, in the analytic of finitude, is
 a strange empirico-transcendental doublet," at once a mere finite
 being, a natural part of a natural world, and the "being such that
 knowledge will be attained in him of what renders all knowledge
 possible" (318). Man's vision comes into existence with his blind-
 ness: "This obscure space"-what Foucault calls the "unthought"
 to the modern cogito-"is both exterior to him and indispensable
 to him: in one sense the shadow cast by man as he emerged in the
 field of knowledge; in another, the blind stain by which it is pos-
 sible to know him" (326). It is the simultaneous emergence of
 ignorance and knowledge, blindness and vision, cogito and "un-
 thought" that joins together, at their deepest archaeological strata,
 the "two great forms of analysis of our day," namely, "interpreta-
 tion and formalism" (299).
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 Foucault pursues this idea of man, and the human sciences,
 as "figuration of finitude" along several trajectories, two of which
 are important for our present purpose. The first concerns observa-
 tional metaphors. When man is subject to the great "archaeological
 mutation" in which he appears "in his ambiguous position as an
 object of knowledge and as a subject that knows," it does not mean
 that we simply supersede the infamous Classical optic. Rather, the
 very space of observation is volatilized, internally fissured by the
 finitude introduced and figured by man. As a result, we get figures
 of instability and conceptual reversibility, an "enslaved sovereign,"
 an "observed spectator" (312). The second trajectory concerns
 temporality. If man now comes to stand for an essential instability
 in the spatial register, both observer and observed, he similarly
 finds himself figuring the essential instability of historicity: "It is
 no longer origin that gives rise to historicity; it is historicity that,
 in its very fabric, makes possible the necessity of an origin that
 must be both internal and foreign to it" (329). Man becomes the
 very point of this paradoxical articulation:
 the original in man is that which articulates him from the very
 outset upon something other than himself... it is that which,
 by binding him to multiple, intersecting, mutually irreducible
 chronologies, scatters him through time and pinions him at
 the center of the duration of things. (331)
 Just as man's very emergence into visibility will be figured equally
 by the triumph of observation and the "blind stain by which it is
 possible to know him," so too man will be at once the "origin" and
 "center" of a newly powerful historicity and that same origin's par-
 adoxical temporal implosion, its "recession to itself" (372).
 Lest we seem to have strayed too far from the historical di-
 mension outlined by Luhmann and others, let us recall that the
 disturbances of vision and chronology described by Foucault are
 the natural outcome of the evolutionary drift away from simple
 "interaction." For Foucault, too, the crucial moment concerns the
 infolding of others' calculations in one's own, the doubling-back of
 representations of the social within the realm of social action:
 [T]here will be no science of man unless we examine the way
 in which individuals or groups represent to themselves the
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 partners with whom they produce or exchange, the mode in
 which they clarify or ignore or mask this function and the posi-
 tion they occupy in it, the manner in which they represent to
 themselves the society in which it takes place, the way in which
 they feel themselves integrated with it or isolated from it, de-
 pendent, subject, or free. (352-53)
 The human sciences must take as their proper object social behav-
 ior in which the theoretical plane of representations is inextricably
 folded into the plane of action itself. For this reason, the thought
 of the social sciences, just like the social thought they study, is "no
 longer theoretical." As soon as such thought operates, "it offends
 or reconciles, attracts or repels, breaks, dissociates, unites or re-
 unites.... Thought... is in itself an action-a perilous act" (328).
 Faced with this dilemma of being strung between formalization
 and interpretation, it is perhaps not surprising that the human
 sciences have become the terrain for the most vigorous epistemo-
 logical debate and innovation in the past few generations. Toward
 the end of The Order of Things, Foucault suggests that the insistent
 attention to their own self-division, their own problem of finitude,
 has led the human sciences into what he calls an "'ana-' or 'hypo-
 epistemological' position":
 the human sciences, when they duplicate themselves, are di-
 rected not at the establishment of a formalized discourse: on
 the contrary, they thrust man, whom they take as their object
 in the area of finitude, relativity, and perspective, down into
 the area of the endless erosion of time. (355)
 Foucault's analysis leads to a vision of the human sciences as a kind
 of epistemological sink-hole: unable to pass beyond an analytic of
 finitude but equally unable to look away, as if were we not to ob-
 serve man's blind spots, there would be nothing left to observe.
 In the analysis that follows, I want to unpack this idea that
 the human sciences occupy a "hypo-epistemological position." If
 we look at the grand theoretical endeavors of Lacan and Luh-
 mann, we can see certain shared patterns of figuration, despite
 other very considerable, indeed irreconcilable, differences in their
 basic assumptions. Both Lacan and Luhmann are markedly in-
 fluenced by the "linguistic turn" of the 20th century, and more
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 specifically, by the promise of formalization seemingly offered by
 cybernetics's understanding of communication. The psychoanalyst
 and the sociologist must both contend, however, with the folding-
 over of theoretical reflection into the object of their inquiry, with
 the fact that, in Claude Levi-Strauss's words, theirs are analytic
 endeavors in which "the observer himself is part of his observa-
 tion" (29). Both Lacan and Luhmann thus start from that opening
 wedge between the subject and society, between "interaction" and
 a structural or formal understanding of social behavior; in this re-
 gard, their considerable attention to epistemological matters is
 dedicated to keeping these two halves from collapsing into one an-
 other. But their epistemology is self-consuming; it is not pursued
 to clear the field of confusions but rather occupies the entire theo-
 retical field itself. It does this only because it is itself incomplete,
 with a hole in its middle. At those moments when the theoretical
 work of these thinkers becomes hypo-epistemological, when it con-
 fronts its own internal limit, we see reemerge the disturbances of
 vision and chronology that lie at the heart of the experience of
 finitude. Thus, these anti- or post-humanist endeavors reinstate
 the figure of man in the place of his erasure; man becomes, as
 Lacan says, "strictly equivalent to his own inexistence" or, in Fou-
 cault's famous image, a "face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea"
 (Foucault 387).
 I. Lacan and the Blind Gaze
 As Foucault remarks at the end of The Order of Things, psycho-
 analysis and ethnology "have been constituted in confrontation, in
 a fundamental correlation" (379). They are inversions of each
 other, in disputation over how to understand the "double articula-
 tion of the history of individuals upon the unconscious of culture,
 and of the historicity of those cultures upon the unconscious of
 individuals" (379). In a series of influential texts of the late forties
 and early fifties-most notably the "Introduction to the Work of
 Marcel Mauss" (1950)-Levi-Strauss entered this confrontation
 with psychoanalysis, seeking to redirect inquiry away from the
 "American psycho-sociological school" exemplified by Ruth Bene-
 dict and Margaret Mead, and toward his emerging structural an-
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 thropology (11). In making this argument in the "Introduction,"
 Levi-Strauss turned to a new conception of the operation of com-
 munication. To be sure, "the ethnological problem is a problem of
 communication" (36). But in approaching this problem one must
 look behind the pasteboard egos who communicate and toward
 the unconscious of the system, communication itself. Such a per-
 spective no longer discloses intersubjective encounters of a more
 or less frustrating sort, but the "unconscious itineraries of that en-
 counter" (36), that is, mere communicative functions producing
 difference in their endless turns. The seemingly insurmountable
 gulf of difference between subjectivities is surpassed by being func-
 tionalized; difference is not a fact of being but the fundamental
 operation of a system that surpasses any freeze-frame picture of
 its workings. This interpretive swerve leads Levi-Strauss to invoke
 all the motifs so familiar to our structuralist, post-structuralist,
 systems-theoretical landscape. He encourages us to follow the
 example of Trubetskoy and Jakobson's structural linguistics, and
 look for the "infrastructure simpler than any [phenomenological
 given], to which the given owes its whole reality" (41). Mauss, too,
 is celebrated for construing the "notion of function following the
 example of algebra, implying, that is, that social values are know-
 able as functions of one another" (43). Ultimately, Levi-Strauss
 hopes-as Lacan will ever afterward-for the "progressive ma-
 thematisation of the field" (43) of the human sciences, a hope in-
 spired in him by the success of cybernetics's "application of mathe-
 matical reasoning to the study of phenomena of communication"
 (44). Levi-Strauss theorizes the entirety of what transpires in com-
 munication as the workings of a social "symbolic."
 In part through the influence of Levi-Strauss's interest in lin-
 guistics and cybernetics, Lacan began in the fifties to articulate
 with more precision the relation so central to Levi-Strauss's theori-
 zation of the elementary laws of the symbolic, namely, the relation
 of the individual to the larger network of social signification in
 which he or she is caught up. For Lacan, this takes the form of
 demarcating the respective dimensions of the imaginary and what
 he calls, with Levi-Strauss, the "symbolic." To gain some sense of
 the context in which Lacan began elaborating this distinction so
 central to all his later thinking, one need only look carefully at his
 second seminar of 1954-55. Taking up the topic of "The Ego in
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 the Theory of Freud and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis," the
 seminar was conducted parallel to a series of lectures on "Psycho-
 analysis and the Human Sciences," which featured presentations
 by (among others) Alexandre Koyre, Levi-Strauss ("Kinship versus
 the Family"), Merleau-Ponty, Benveniste, and Hyppolite, and
 which concluded with a lecture by Lacan himself, titled "Psycho-
 analysis and Cybernetics, or on the nature of language."2 In focus-
 ing on the ego, Lacan is, as always, actually hammering home the
 necessity of moving beyond it; he is continuing his bitter quarrel
 with the ego-psychology then in power in the International Psy-
 choanalytical Association. Like Levi-Strauss, Lacan is interested in
 this seminar in articulating and defining theoretically a trans-
 subjective "symbolic order" that reflects the new thinking about
 the formal autonomy of language and communication. But Lacan
 differs from Levi-Strauss in taking as his point of departure the
 inadequacy of the individual's regulative function in relation to the
 symbolic order:
 Beyond the homeostases of the ego, there exists a dimension,
 another current, another necessity, whose plane must be dif-
 ferentiated. This compulsion to return to something which has
 been excluded by the subject, or which never entered into it,
 the Verdrdngt, the repressed, we cannot bring it back within the
 pleasure principle. If the ego as such rediscovers and recog-
 nises itself, it is because there is a beyond to the ego, an uncon-
 scious, a subject which speaks, unknown to the subject. (171)
 Both Levi-Strauss and Lacan appeal to a notion of the uncon-
 scious that seems to offer a way out of the phenomenological
 impasses of intersubjectivity. For Lacan, however, there is no way
 beyond such impasses but through; that is, the "beyond of the ego"
 is apprehensible only because "the ego rediscovers and recognises
 itself." The turns of reflection and self-consciousness are what re-
 veal the fundamental asymmetry of the individual's relation to the
 larger social-symbolic world of communication in which he finds
 himself caught. The unconscious operating "beyond the ego" is
 tracked in this seminar as a "signifying insistence" (a Lacanian turn
 on Freud's repetition compulsion), a kind of acephalic desire that
 disturbs and disrupts the psychic system's fundamental inertia, its
 homeostatic or restitutive function (60-61). On the other hand,
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 the "insistence" of signification is insistent only for an ego. As La-
 can demonstrates in his treatment of cybernetics, one can construct
 a machine that "embodies the most radical symbolic activity of
 man" (74), namely, the creation of a "world of symbols . . . organi-
 sed around the correlation of absence and presence" (300), but
 one will not thereby have embodied anything like an unconscious.
 The unconscious, as Lacan develops the concept in this seminar,
 names the principle of disjunction between the ego and the sym-
 bolic, and is "proper" neither to one nor the other. The fact that
 through "cybernetics, the symbol is embodied in an apparatus ...
 in a literally trans-subjective way" (304) does not lead to the con-
 clusion that humans are in essence symbolic, and only epiphenom-
 enally subjective-or that, as Levi-Strauss remarks a number of
 times in his essay on Mauss, the symbolic system is "more real"
 than what carries out its functions. On the contrary, what cybernet-
 ics's embodiment "of an order which subsists in its rigour, indepen-
 dently of all subjectivity" (304) effectively makes visible is the rift
 opened up, within subjectivity as within sociality, between the imagi-
 nary and symbolic registers. This rift is the location of an uncon-
 scious that exhibits, paradoxically, both the "radical difference" be-
 tween the symbolic and the imaginary registers, and the fact that
 "there is something in the symbolic function of human discourse
 that cannot be eliminated, and that is the role played in it by the
 imaginary" (306). Imaginary and symbolic require each other for
 their own articulation, but only articulate themselves as disarticu-
 lated from each other.
 How does Lacan arrive at such a complex and paradoxical
 notion? The fact that there exists a "role played in it by the imagi-
 nary" that "cannot be eliminated" may well seem troubling to the
 notion of the autonomy of symbolic signification. If the symbolic
 order is only ever revealed-experientially, theoretically, or ana-
 lytically-via the imaginary, what prevents the very autonomy of
 the symbolic from being simply another version of imaginary mis-
 recognition? After all, it is precisely the function and role of the
 imaginary to secure the illusions of autonomy and identity out of
 a fundamental alienation. Lacan confronts this question directly
 toward the end of his lecture on cybernetics and psychoanalysis:
 "The issue is to know whether the symbolic exists as such, or
 whether the symbolic is simply the fantasy of the second degree of
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 the imaginary coaptations" (306-07). He will insist in this seminar,
 and with increasing vehemence throughout his later work, that the
 symbolic does indeed "function in the real, independently of any
 subjectivity," because the option for him is to imagine the possi-
 bility of reducing this symbolic "beyond" to the functional dimen-
 sions of the imaginary, of dissipating its transcendent status
 through an ego-psychological "rectification," or "normalisation in
 terms of the imaginary" (307)-in other words, to capitulate to the
 ego-psychologists' goal of helping the patient produce a "healthy
 ego." But Lacan's insistence on the simultaneous inextricability
 and irreducibility between imaginary and symbolic registers means
 that he will commit himself fundamentally to observational scenar-
 ios, in which the move "beyond" the imaginary looks more like an
 internal crack or failure within imaginary reflection itself.
 It is thus not surprising that Lacan develops his most famous
 parable of observation, his reading of Poe's "The Purloined Let-
 ter," in this theoretical context. In both its full text in Ecrits and its
 initial development in the course of the seminar, the treatment of
 "The Purloined Letter" concerned the way in which the symbolic
 "is attained most especially on the imaginary level" (177). What
 Poe's story stages for Lacan, both in its essential plotting concern-
 ing the letter's displacements and, just as crucially, in the interpo-
 lated commentary about the game of even and odd, is the recogni-
 tion that purely imaginary observational scenarios have built into
 them a kind of essential fracture, a place of failure or opening, that
 opens onto the symbolic:
 What's at issue is an essential alien [dissemblable], who is nei-
 ther the supplement, nor the complement of the fellow being
 [semblable], who is the very image of dislocation, of the essential
 tearing apart of the subject. The subject passes beyond this
 glass in which he always sees, entangled, his own image. (177)
 A page later Lacan repeats: "Under certain conditions, this imagi-
 nary relation itself reaches its own limit, and the ego fades away,
 dissipates, becomes disorganized, dissolves" (178). In "The Pur-
 loined Letter," the series of observers of observation (the Queen,
 the Minister, Dupin, etc.) believe themselves to have seen the dy-
 namic of looks in its entirety-to have, as it were, the imaginary,
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 intersubjective scenario fully laid out before them. The observers
 of observation are not wrong; they correctly assess what they see
 in the room. Lacan's point is rather that we have here a parable of
 the imaginary relation reaching its own point of dissolution, in
 which the observational vantage cannot stay merely observational,
 but finds itself caught up, precipitated, into a symbolic circuit of
 action. It is this position in the symbolic circuit, defined by the
 relation to the letter, that most profoundly confers identity on the
 story's players, and not any one character's adequate or inade-
 quate reflective understanding.
 The appearance of the symbolic dimension beyond the imagi-
 nary is, then, a problem of action and of time. To demonstrate this
 more clearly, we will refer to an earlier essay, the essential elements
 of which reappear at the end of the 1955 seminar, where the essay
 is described as illustrating precisely the importance of"distinguish-
 ing the imaginary from the symbolic" (287). It is a text originally
 written in 1945, titled "Logical Time and the Assertion of Antici-
 pated Certitude: A New Sophism." I will quote John Forrester's
 translation of the scenario, which can be found in his excellent
 commentary on Lacan's theories of temporality. A "prison gover-
 nor" must free one of three prisoners and will allow their "lot to
 be determined by a test":
 There are three of you here. Here are five discs which
 differ only in their colour: three are white, and two are black.
 Without letting you know which of them I have chosen, I am
 going to fasten one of these discs between each of your shoul-
 ders, that is to say, out of the bearer's direct vision; all possi-
 bility of his being able to catch sight of it indirectly is also ex-
 cluded by the absence here of any means of looking at himself.
 Thereafter you will be free to consider at your leisure
 your companions and their respective discs, without being al-
 lowed, of course, to communicate to each other the fruits of
 your inspection ... [T]he first who can deduce his own colour
 shall profit from the measure of liberty of which we dispose.
 (Forrester 178-79)
 All three prisoners are then given white discs. "After they have
 pondered a certain time, the three subjects together make a few
 steps toward the door, arriving there abreast." They each give the
 following reasoning:
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 I am a white, here is how I know it. Given that my companions
 were whites, I thought that, if I were a black, each of them
 would have been able to make the following inference: "If I
 were also a black, the other, immediately realising from this
 that he is a white, would have left straight away; therefore I
 am not a black." And the two others would have left together,
 convinced of being whites. If they stayed put, it is because I
 am a white like them. (179)
 Forrester asserts that this sophism serves Lacan in his later work
 as "the model for all the relations between the subject, a set of signi-
 fiers, and temporality" (179-80). From our perspective, its impor-
 tance lies in its presentation of the modulation, through a distinc-
 tive temporality, between imaginary and symbolic registers. The
 strictly reflective, imaginary methods at the disposal of the prison-
 ers can lead to a knowledge of the symbolic structure in which they
 are caught only by virtue of an odd temporal jump between what
 Lacan calls the "time for understanding"-"directly articulated
 upon the time of meditation of the other," as Forrester writes-
 and what he calls the "moment for concluding." Out of a strict
 intersubjectivity, in other words, emerges a dimension beyond, one
 in which certitude cannot be had through a mere reflective assesse-
 ment, but can only be retroactively verified by an action that is
 already presented as being too late: "From hesitating, a pulsation
 leads immediately to being too late. This precipitation is not simply
 a contingent effect of the dramatic situation; the subject must make
 haste, because if he does not, and the two others beat him to it,
 then he will no longer be sure that he is not black" (181).
 Commenting on this sophism 10 years later in the seminar,
 Lacan claims that it demonstrates that a "relation to time peculiar
 to the human being" governs this movement of haste beyond the
 intersubjective: "there is a third dimension of time which [cyber-
 netic machines] are not party to,... which is neither belatedness,
 nor being in advance, but haste.... That is where speech is to be
 found, and where language, which has all the time in the world, is
 not" (Seminar, Book II 291). And in the lecture on cybernetics, he
 makes the point again:
 With a machine, whatever doesn't come on time simply falls
 by the wayside and makes no claims on anything. This is not
 true for man, the scansion is alive, and whatever doesn't come
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 on time remains in suspense. That is what is involved in re-
 pression. (307-8)
 When Lacan writes, in the seminar, that "the subject [of the
 sophism] holds in his hands the very articulation by which the
 truth he sifts out is inseparable from the very action which attests
 to it" (289), we have in fact a double, paradoxical articulation. The
 subject can "know" something only by acting in haste, by a "precip-
 itation in the act" (289), a precipitation that is always ahead of the
 verification it brings. If it is in some sense true that the subject
 "holds in his hands" the articulation necessary to arrive at the
 truth, then, it could just as easily be said that the subject's "precipi-
 tation in the act" just is the articulation between the truth arrived
 at in the imaginary "time for comprehending" and its manifesta-
 tion in the symbolic "moment for concluding." This temporal
 lurch-like stepping onto the moving platform of a carousel-is
 that whereby the subject modulates, perhaps agonizingly, but al-
 ways in the anxiety of "haste," between he who articulates signifiers
 and he who merely embodies the articulation of signifiers. The
 vantage from which it seems that the subject manipulates signifiers
 (white, black) to represent another subject (himself), suddenly flips
 over into a temporalized movement in which the "signifier ... rep-
 resents the subject for another signifer" ("Subversion of the Sub-
 ject" 317).
 Lacan here imagines man at a point of radical temporal dis-
 junction, a "precipitation in the act," a tumbling over or lurching
 movement. Man does not articulate here, but is shown to be articu-
 lated temporally. Thus, the "precipitation in the act"-even as it,
 in anticipating, moves beyond whatever certitude the reflective
 ego can attain, even as it presents the surpassing of the self-does
 not move beyond identity but rather bores into its most secret
 mechanism. A seemingly semantic pattern can help draw out this
 connection between imaginary and symbolic identity. In the essay
 on "logical time," Lacan describes a process of "decanting" by
 which the "I"-the "je" of the conclusive assertion (which is pre-
 sented definitively only in the act of making for the door)-is
 drawn off from the earlier moments of reflection, each with their
 appropriate "subject" forms.3 This final identity-marker, the one
 bound up with the anticipated certitude of the act, is
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 isolated by a beat of logical time with the other, that is with the
 relation of reciprocity. This movement of the logical genesis of
 theje, by means of a decanting of its own time, is parallel to its
 psychological birth. In the same way that... the psychological
 "I" disengages itself from an undetermined specular transitiv-
 ism ... the "I" in question here is defined by the subjectivizing
 of a competition with the other in the function of logical
 time. (208)
 Given this explicit parallel between the "logical genesis" of the je
 and its "psychological birth," it is perhaps not surprising that the
 same odd figure of "decanting" should emerge later in Lacan's
 treatment of the construction of identity-in-difference that is the
 mirror stage. Samuel Weber has directed attention to what he
 takes to be a crucial addition to the theorization of the mirror
 stage, a revision articulated by Lacan in his paper on Daniel La-
 gache's "Psychoanalysis and the Structure of the Personality." "The
 context," writes Weber, "is defined by the question of the Other
 (capital O): that is, by the function of alterity or heterogeneity in
 discourse" (116). (It is, of course, precisely this question that ani-
 mates the entirety of the second seminar. Jacques-Alain Miller
 draws attention to this trajectory by titling the third section of the
 text "Beyond the Imaginary, the Symbolic; or, From the Little to
 the Big Other.") Weber notes a slight revision in the canonical pre-
 sentation of the child's recognition and jubilation before the
 mirror:
 In contrast to Lagache's "personalistic" interpretation of
 Freudian doctrine, Lacan stresses the impersonal structure "of
 this Other, where discourse is situated"; such alterity, he con-
 tinues, reaches to "the purest moment of the mirror relation."
 What is this "purest moment"? Lacan locates it [and here
 Weber translates the passage to be found in Ecrits 678)] in the
 gesture by which the child at the mirror, turning around to
 the person carrying it, appeals with a look to the witness who
 decants, by verifying it, the recognition of the image from the
 jubilant assumption, in which, to be sure, it [such recognition]
 already was. (116)
 Let us clarify what is at issue here. Weber understands the
 "verification" being provided by the "witness" as intervening
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 between two moments-recognition and jubilation-that had ear-
 lier seemed coeval:
 In the original version of the text of the mirror stage, the effect
 of the reflection upon the child seemed to result from its rec-
 ognition of the image as its own likeness.... In the later essay,
 recognition is no longer enough; instead, in its stead, there
 appears the anxiety which causes the child to twist back, turn-
 ing around, and in this gesture, to seek the confirming look of
 another ... [T]he jubilant reaction does not relieve the child
 from having to seek something like an acknowledgement of
 the other. In this sense, recognition is no longer a process or-
 ganized around two poles: child and mirror image, subject
 and object. Instead, it emerges as a triadic relation in which
 the acknowledgement emanates not from the self-identical
 ego, but from the "person who carries it," that is, from the
 place of the Other. (118)
 We could say, perhaps, that the jubilant assumption of identity in
 the mirror stage, in the imaginary, was a bit hasty, a bit precipitate,
 because it now seems to need to be verified. But recall that the
 lurch into the symbolic in the essay on logical time was exactly
 coincident with this precipitation into action and that this was also
 the verification of the truth that could be certified in no other way
 for the merely reflective ego. The temporal suspension at work in
 this imbrication of the symbolic within the imaginary construction
 of identity is once again on Lacan's mind. The "event" in question
 here is the very assumption and recognition of identity, whose sta-
 tus is forever suspended in a temporal distention by the "tertiary
 presence" of the symbolic.
 But what about this mysterious "witness" who appears in this
 essay, who verifies, who decants, and who, as Lacan insists, "owes
 nothing to the anecdotal figure who incarnates it" ("Remarque"
 678)? Weber remarks that this Other "can in essence be deter-
 mined neither as an individual, nor as a social function, nor as a
 subject in general. Indeed, it is nothing more than the differen-
 tiality upon which discourse depends" (119). The status of the
 "witness" as pure differentiality would seem to accord well to its
 temporal paradoxicality, its coming to be only in no longer being
 there. This mysterious Lacanian "witness" who stands behind the
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 games of mirror-identity and ego-construction is precisely the
 guarantor of that game in constituting its exception and undoing.
 This is a witness who verifies by disappearing, whose temporal
 fading as pure differentiality attests to a symbolic order which is
 beyond time. Such would seem to be the implication of a par-
 ticularly metaphysical moment towards the end of the second
 seminar:
 The wager lies at the heart of any radical question bearing on
 symbolic thought. Everything comes back to to be or not to be, to
 the choice between what will or won't come out, to the primor-
 dial couple of plus or minus. But presence as absence connotes
 possible absence or presence. As soon as the subject comes
 himself to be, he owes it to a certain non-being on which he
 raises his being. And if he isn't, if he isn't something, he obvi-
 ously bears witness to some kind of absence, but he will always
 remain purveyor of this absence. I mean that he will bear the
 burden of its proof for lack of being capable of proving the
 presence. (192)
 There is a structure of debt here and of witnessing that issues in-
 eluctably from the "primordial couple of plus or minus," presence
 or absence, being or non-being. But this structure is asymmetrical,
 out of whack; the second terms-minus, absence, non-being: in
 short, differentiality-always have the upper hand. If the subject
 comes to be, "he owes it to a certain non-being on which he raises
 his being." In notable contrast, the "structure of that tertiary pres-
 ence" of the witness "owes nothing to the anecdotal figure that incar-
 nates it." This witness guarantees, stands surety for, the game that
 plays out the inevitable collapse of all witnessing. In the "wager"
 that starts with pure differentiality-the wager of a post-
 ontological social thought founded on the nonfoundation of a
 signifying order with no positive terms-the game is secured, the
 structural order guaranteed and verified, by the very collapse or
 evanscence of the terms or figures who serve as its "human sup-
 port" (192). Negation is primal, because the "primordial couple"
 is such only through its own self-cancelling.
 At the same time, however, we may well question this erection
 of a debt-free symbolic realm, one that owes nothing to its human
 supports, its only theater. For, as Lacan himself insists, this order
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 of non-being shares one essential feature with its human support:
 an insistent desire. Here are the closing words of the seminar:
 "The symbolic order is simultaneously non-being and insisting to
 be, that is what Freud has in mind when he talks about the death
 instinct as being what is most fundamental-a symbolic order in
 travail, in the process of coming, insisting on being realised" (326).
 The paradox of this relation between being and non-being is what
 realizes itself in the strange image of the witness or blind gaze in
 Lacan's thought. For it is precisely by demanding that the subject
 "verify" its (self)recognition through an appeal to a "witness" who
 fades away before one's eyes and who thus images the "essential
 tearing apart of the subject"-it is precisely in giving over to the
 human his own self-superseding in signification that non-being
 comes to be. The big Other, which has no ontological status, para-
 doxically comes to be, realizes itself, in the movement whereby the
 human recreates himself in the image of the blind gaze to which,
 he can't help feeling, he owes everything.
 When Foucault writes that the social order and the figure of
 man are co-created on the ground of a radical finitude, he could
 well be describing Lacan's construction of the symbolic. Just as
 Foucault writes of the "blind stain by which it is possible to know"
 man, Lacan talks of the symbolic as "like an image in the mirror,
 but of a different order." This order is a kind of monstrous beyond
 of the imaginary, a beyond of the elaborate optics defining the po-
 sitionality of self and other. "It isn't for nothing that Odysseus
 pierces the eye of the Cyclop," Lacan continues gnomically (185).
 The symbolic can only appear through a mutation process within
 the imaginary, in which vision and reflection is first inflated to the
 monstrous proportions of the singular Cyclopean eye, and then
 blinded, passed beyond, negated. Such a negation, such a recogni-
 tion of the stain in the mirror, which is also already a passing be-
 yond it, is perhaps the ultimate "precipitation in the act," the tem-
 poral lurch bestowing identity. Lacan comments that it is only by
 blinding the Cyclops, creating of him a blind gaze, that the subject
 can open communication. This symbolic realm of communication
 is the home of negation and radical finitude, in which man attains
 a paradoxical freedom and identity in knowing himself to be, like
 Odysseus, "No Man."
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 II. Luhmann and the Constructed Observer
 Niklas Luhmann's systems-theoretical sociology does not un-
 derestimate the immense creativity of Odysseus's negating prow-
 ess.4 Luhmann's work is a career-long celebration of the fecundat-
 ing power of distinctions, and reading his work can at times be a
 dizzying enterprise, as his terms and oppositions reproduce in a
 process of discursive mitosis. His is also one of the more extended
 and impressive explorations of the power of systems to operate
 paradoxically and self-referentially, which makes it hardly surpris-
 ing that his arguments rarely proceed in a linear fashion, but
 rather by a reiterative process. Luhmann's oeuvre is vast and com-
 plex, even for someone who reads him in translation; there can be,
 therefore, no question of surveying the entire range and import of
 that work.5 I want instead merely to present enough of his theoret-
 ical edifice to situate an interrogation of a particularly insistent dis-
 tinction in his theory, namely the unconditional divorce between
 what he calls psychic systems and social systems.
 Like Levi-Strauss and Lacan, though perhaps with even more
 vehemence, Luhmann wishes to avoid the lures of any theoretical
 understanding based on models of the subject of reflection: "The
 subjectivist problem was to state and to show how it is possible by
 means of introspection-that is by the passage to the self-reference
 of one's own consciousness-to form judgments about the world
 of others" ("Cognitive Program" 66). It is not possible, asserts Luh-
 mann; and indeed the realization of this limit was both the result
 of, and the further spur for, the differentiation of society and inter-
 action in modernity-that is, the empirical and theoretical divide
 between a sociality understood on the model of a face-to-face inter-
 subjectivity (which is, after all, finally the model of subjectivity) and
 one thought of as operating according to its own nonsubjective
 operations. A fundamental consequence of discarding subjectivist
 approaches to sociality is the recognition, by now canonical, that
 there is no vantage-even the theoretical one of "absolute knowl-
 edge"-from which one can perceive and know a reality as abso-
 lutely external to oneself. The optics of self-reflection, inaugurated
 for modernity in Cartesian dualism, must be replaced by a func-
 tionalized understanding of primal difference. Thus, we get the
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 familiar view of a signifying order beyond representationalism or
 realism:
 Cognition is neither the copying nor the mapping nor the rep-
 resentation of an external world in a system. Cognition is the
 realization of combinatorial gains on the basis of the differenti-
 ation of a system that is closed off from its environment (but
 nonetheless "contained" in that environment). ("Cognitive
 Program" 69)
 The notion of a "system closed off from its environment" is
 fundamental to Luhmann's thought. Following both systems
 theory and, more crucially, the theory of autopoiesis of Maturana
 and Varela, the notion of closure here put forward needs to be
 understood in all its equivocalness. A system effects closure not
 through a radical indifference to its environment, a pure unaffect-
 edness; rather, being operationally closed means that changes in
 the environment can function only as "triggers" for the system and
 take effect in the system only when, and if, they are coded by the
 internal system as systemic (and not environmental). Such a view
 of the system/environment relation emphasizes autonomy and clo-
 sure; it repudiates strict causal interpretations (where, for instance,
 an environmental factor can unilaterally "cause" a change in a
 given system) and it disallows input-output models (wherein a sys-
 tem might be seen to "process" environmental factors). Most im-
 portantly for our argument, it is fundamentally opposed to any
 view of the relation between system and environment based on
 modelling, or likeness; there can be no ground on which two sys-
 tems can recognize themselves as "like each other," since there is
 no system that does not reproduce itself save by closure, by differ-
 entiation: "The function of the boundaries [of any system] is not
 to pave the way out of the system but to secure discontinuity" (66).
 Like Lacan's irreducible function of misrecognition, this view
 of system closure is bracingly anti-humanist when considered from
 the vantage of any psychology:
 By this means [the theory of autopoietic systemic closure], the
 significance of psychological epistemologies is considerably
 reduced, but relieved at the same time of the unreasonable
 expectation that they should provide more than individual-
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 psychological knowledge. There is no such thing as "man," no
 one has ever seen him and if one is interested in the system of
 observation that organizes its distinctions by means of this
 word or concept one discovers the communication-system
 called society. There are now approximately 5 billion psycho-
 logical systems. It has to be asked which of these 5 billion is
 intended when a theory of knowledge employing a psycholog-
 ical reference system relates concepts such as observation and
 cognition to consciousness. (78)
 The same point is made in slightly different terms in a recent
 article specifically dealing with the relation between psychic and
 social systems:
 Everyone knows, of course, that the word "human being" is
 not a human being. We must also learn that there is nothing
 in the unity of an object that corresponds to the word. Words
 such as "human being," "soul," "person," "subject," and "indi-
 vidual" are nothing more than what they effect in communica-
 tion. They are cognitive operators insofar as they enable the
 calculation of continued communication.... The unity that
 they represent owes its existence to communication. ("How
 Can the Mind Participate?" 387)
 The names for identity do not refer outside the system in which
 they operate. That is, there is no "real" unity of human identity
 corresponding to the words "soul," etc.; there is only what commu-
 nication can do with this word. The system-reference for such sig-
 nifiers is not, in other words, the psychic system, but the social sys-
 tem, for it is only the social system, according to Luhmann, that
 reproduces itself by means of communication; the psychic system
 reproduces itself as an autopoiesis of consciousness ("Autopoiesis"
 2). In the communication system that simply is society, "subjects
 are spoken of to define the self-referential foundation of the cogni-
 tions of the mind" ("How Can the Mind Participate?" 387). Con-
 sciousness, as an autopoietic system, may have a kind of paradoxi-
 cal and self-referential unity, but it has nothing to do with the unity
 of a word like "person," which is merely a "cognitive operator" and
 thus "owes its existence to communication." In short, Luhmann
 agrees with Lacan on this question: the signifier represents the
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 subject for another signifier. It is only in order to keep communica-
 tion going that the unities of "person," etc. are fabricated. Because
 psychic systems are wholly environmental for social systems, the
 latter have to fabricate their own discursive unities-the notorious
 ideologemes of humanism: "soul," "person," "subject," "individ-
 ual," and "human being."
 But why? Why should communication systems-that is, social
 systems-need to create this figment of individual identity? This
 question touches on one of the most difficult issues in Luhmann's
 theoretical enterprise, the description of the mode of relation be-
 tween psychic systems and social systems. For it turns out that they
 are not only, or not merely, environmental for one another, despite
 Luhmann's insistence that they remain so in the theoretical last
 instance. Their relation is more complicated. In what Luhmann
 concedes is a less than satisfying expression, he claims that psychic
 and social systems "interpenetrate." He explains:
 "Interpenetration" does not refer to a comprehensive system
 of coordination or to an operative process of exchange (some-
 thing that would require being able to talk about inputs and
 outputs in this sense). "Interpenetration" can only mean: the
 unity and complexity (as opposed to specific conditions and
 operations) of the one is given a function within the system
 of the other. ("How Can the Mind Participate?" 386; see also
 "Individuality" 117)
 The name for the interpenetration of psychic and social systems
 when seen from the psychic system is "socialization" (386). "Com-
 munications systems," on the other hand, "experience interpene-
 tration by considering the personal dynamics of humans in their
 physical and mental (including the mind) dimensions" (386). But
 it is puzzling that a strictly nonpsychic system of communication
 could be in a position to "consider ... personal dynamics," much
 less "experience" anything at all. As with Lacan's mysterious char-
 acterization of the symbolic dimension "insisting" on being, we re-
 turn here, in Luhmann's theory, to a discursive, signifying system
 that in essence opposes and excludes the psychic dimension, and
 yet somehow is endowed with expressive desires, insistence, abili-
 ties to "experience." What does the communication system's "con-
 sideration of personal dynamics" look like?
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 Answering this question leads us back to the motif we have
 been examining throughout this essay-namely, the oddly central
 status of the figure of the observer in theories of nonsubjective
 signifying orders. In order to comprehend Luhmann's complex
 answer to this question, we need to widen the perspective some-
 what. In an early programmatic essay titled "Meaning as Sociol-
 ogy's Basic Concept," one does not find such emphasis on the radi-
 cal disjunction between psychic and social systems. The influence
 of Husserl and Parsons on Luhmann's thinking is more pro-
 nounced at this point in his career, and it is Parsons, indeed, who
 bequeaths to Luhmann the problem of "double contingency": "All
 experience or action that is oriented to others is doubly contingent
 in that it does not depend solely on me, but also on the Other, who
 I must regard as an alter ego, i.e., as just as free and unpredictable
 as I am" ("Meaning" 45). In this early essay, the transition from
 such intersubjective scenarios to social structures is considerably
 more integrated than it will later become. It is still possible for
 Luhmann to write that, although "social structures do not take the
 form of expectations about behavior"-that would be to return to
 a notion of sociology as concerned with the elemental unit of "ac-
 tion" rather than "meaning," precisely the notion being disputed
 in this essay-they can be understood as the maintenance of a cer-
 tain "level of reflexive expectation," or "expectations about expec-
 tations" (45). There would seem, then, to be a crucial role for a
 kind of intersubjective reflection in the creation of social struc-
 tures.
 At the same time, however, "meaning" is already operating in
 this early essay as the conceptual wedge between psyche and social-
 ity, opening up the possibility, more and more vigorously pursued
 through the next 20 years, of emptying out this reflection of any
 subjective reference.6 Habermas has criticized Luhmann's theory
 as a philosophy of the subject wholly emptied out of subjectivist
 depths:
 Systems theory has to remove from the "self" of the relation-
 to-self all connotations of an identity of self-consiousness estab-
 lished by synthetic performances. Self-relatedness is character-
 istic of individual systemic accomplishments in their mode of
 operation; but no center in which the system as a whole is
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 made present to itself and knows itself in the form of self-
 consciousness issues from these punctual relations-to-self. In
 this way, the concept of reflexivity is separated from conscious-
 ness. But then an equivalent is needed for the conscious sub-
 strate of the self-relatedness that is distinctive of the level of
 sociocultural life. As an emergent attainment corresponding
 to consciousness, Luhmann introduces a peculiar concept of
 "meaning." (369)
 Whether or not one considers Luhmann's concept of meaning to
 be "peculiar," it is surely right to recognize that what allows for
 "the concept of reflexivity [to be] separated from consciousness" is
 Luhmann's theorization of meaning and, more specifically, "com-
 munication." The theoretical extrication of reflexivity from con-
 sciousness by means of a kind of discourse theory entails, however,
 as it did for Lacan, the rhetorical intrication of the figures of obser-
 vation with the development of the idea of communication. What
 the figure of observation offers, for this paradigm, is the possibility
 (perhaps even the inevitability) of a vantage on the operation of
 the communication system, of seeing the code as code.
 This helps to explain why one sees observers everywhere in
 Luhmann's thought. In "The Cognitive Program of Constructiv-
 ism," his most thoroughgoing epistemological treatment of this
 theme, one comes across sentences that sound like abstract synop-
 ses of Poe's "The Purloined Letter":
 Constructivism describes the observation of observation that
 concentrates on how the observed observer observes. This
 constructivist turn makes possible a qualitative change, a radi-
 cal transformation, in the style of recursive observation, since
 by this means one can also observe what and how an observed
 observer is unable to observe. (73)
 In part, this predilection for the language of observation is due to
 Luhmann's incorporation of the vocabulary of second-order cyber-
 netics. At the same time, we should note that Luhmann's desire
 to ground a notion of reflexivity beyond the subject leads him to
 emphasize not observation as such, but rather its constitutive limit.
 Luhmann's metaphor of observation is, as it were, a self-cancelling
 figure, and thus very like Lacan's in this regard. For the entire
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 point of observation is that it always proceeds by way of a funda-
 mental blindness: "The 'blind spot' of each observation, the dis-
 tinction it employs at the moment, is at the same time its guarantee
 of a world" (70). Later in the same essay, he makes the point
 more fully:
 For cognition, only what serves in a given case as a distinction
 is a guarantee of reality, an equivalent of reality. One could say
 more precisely: The source of distinction's guaranteeing real-
 ity lies in its own operative unity. It is, however, precisely as
 this unity that the distinction cannot be observed-except by
 means of another distinction which then assumes the function
 of guarantor of reality. Another way of expressing this is to
 say that the operation emerges simultaneously with the world
 which as a result remains cognitively unapproachable to the
 operation. (76)
 Every observation involves making a distinction, the background
 operative unity of which is that observation's enabling blind spot,
 at once constituting the system's operational closure and bringing
 forth a world. It would seem that one needs the figure and errancy
 of observation in order to serve as cover for the more profoundly
 creative power of blindness.
 We can already see, I think, how Luhmann's use of this figure
 echoes that of Lacan, for we have here an anti-intuitionist, anti-
 humanist account of the construction of meaning systems that
 constitutes itself on the back of a blinded observer. In reading Luh-
 mann on the difference between psychic and social systems, it often
 feels that Habermas's characterization is apt:
 The flow of official documents among administrative authori-
 ties and the monadically encapsulated consciousness of a Rob-
 inson Crusoe provide the guiding images for the conceptual
 uncoupling of the social and psychic systems, according to
 which the one is supposedly based solely on communication
 and the other solely on consciousness. (378)
 But Luhmann's account of the way psychic systems participate in
 communication is more complex than this characterization, for in
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 fact the two systems "interpenetrate" in a mutually interfering way
 reminiscent of the symbiotic antagonism between Lacan's symbolic
 and imaginary registers.
 Thus, in recent essays, Luhmann has returned to the question
 of the construction of an observer in the kind of intersubjective
 scenarios he has been treating with suspicion for some time. Given
 his own idea of the operational closure of psychic systems, he asks,
 why would an observer observe another observer as observer,
 as another psychical system? Why isn't the other system seen
 simply as a normal object in the external world, that is, why
 isn't it simply observed directly instead of as a pathway for the
 observing of its observing? ("Cognitive Program" 79)
 From the perspective of the psychic system, Luhmann is asking,
 how does it happen that another psychic system can be imagined
 as not merely an object? Luhmann rejects psychological accounts
 in which "it is usually assumed that this is made possible by a sud-
 den, intuitive analogy: the other is experienced as an alter ego,
 as operating like another I" (79); he dismisses as well Maturana's
 attempt to deal with the issue from a biological perspective. Writ-
 ing with a not uncharacteristic disciplinary partisanship, Luhmann
 puts forward a "third theoretical suggestion (which draws on soci-
 ology, since psychology and biology have not sufficed)," namely
 that "the other observer is a necessary consequence of communica-
 tion" (79).
 What Luhmann describes here is a kind of trickery by which
 the system of communication creates the illusion for a psychic sys-
 tem (whose "observation" here is indeed neurophysiological, that
 is, a matter of perception and consciousness) that there is another
 unity-another observer-with whom it can communicate:
 Within the communication system we call society, it is conven-
 tional to assume that humans can communicate. Even clever
 analysts have been fooled by this convention. It is relatively
 easy to see that this statement is false and that it can only func-
 tion as a convention and only within communication. The con-
 vention is necessary because communication necessarily ad-
 dresses its operations to those who are required to continue
 communication. ("How Can the Mind Participate?" 371)
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 A communication system needs psychic systems to reproduce itself,
 but it can only use psychic systems if they are mystified as to their
 own ability to communicate. Those who are "required" to continue
 communication are, paradoxically, those who precisely cannot do
 so, namely the psychic systems called "humans." We get a sense of
 the stringency of this requirement in Luhmann's characterization
 of the mind's "participation" in communication: "it is sufficient for
 the communication process to understand that the mind, virtually
 helpless, must participate" ("How Can the Mind Participate?" 376)
 in the fabrication of this unity of an "other" with whom to commu-
 nicate. And indeed, in a conception reminiscent of Lacan's elabo-
 rate schemas of the optical delusion of the imaginary, Luhmann
 here relies on the idea of "fascination," presenting the mind the
 way explorers and conquistadors used to describe the natives, as
 fascinated by shiny objects: "Language and script fascinate and
 preoccupy the mind and thereby secure its participation" (376);
 these technologies of communication constitute "special experien-
 tial objects that are either extraordinary or fascinating" (375). It
 is in this way that communication leads the psychic system into a
 "detour": "The detour via communication, the participation in a
 completely different operating system, and the attractiveness of the
 constitutive difference of this system are all critical for the constitution
 of an alter ego" (emphasis added)-that is, for the critical, though
 illusory, "convention" that there exists an other with whom I can,
 as psychic system, communicate (385).
 It is not entirely clear what this "attractiveness of the constitu-
 tive difference" between psychic and social system would be. Even
 as Luhmann puts forth an account of how psychic systems are
 lured into imagining and constructing a sameness, he also sees at
 work a kind of alluring differentiation. It turns out, indeed, that
 psychic systems are crucially engaged in distinguishing and
 thereby introduce what could be characterized as a rhetorical di-
 mension to the interpenetration of psychic and social systems.
 "Communication is only possible," writes Luhmann, "when an ob-
 server is able, in his sphere of perception, to distinguish between
 the act of communication and information, that is, to understand
 communicative acts as the conveying of information (and not
 simply as behavior)" ("Cognitive Program" 79). What psychic sys-
 tems are really required to do is distinguish-and that this dis-
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 tinguishing is a matter of the psychic system is emphasized by
 Luhmann's reference to perception-between constative and per-
 formative dimensions of language. Communication cannot con-
 tinue if it does not reproduce itself by means of the distinction
 between information and utterance-or, as the same distinction
 is translated elsewhere, between "facts" and "behaviors." In other
 words, communication is self-divided; although not itself anything
 psychic, much less bodily, it nonetheless needs such psyches and
 bodies to operate, and what it needs them to do is constantly to
 renew their own distinction from the communication system, by
 indicating the difference between information and utterance.
 Communication systems are not merely interpenetrated by psychic
 systems, they are incomplete without them, but paradoxically they
 can only effect closure, complete themselves operationally, by hav-
 ing their own incompletion or dividedness rearticulated. Commu-
 nication reproduces itself by luring psychic systems into attributing
 certain communications to other psychic systems as their "actions"
 ("Autopoiesis" 6-7). In doing this, communication both refers to
 its own constitutive distinction between information and utterance,
 between hetero-reference and self-reference, and it fabricates and
 presupposes the synthesis of these distinctions in the attribution of
 action. Humans, psychic systems, are communication's alibis, its
 constantly rearticulated "presupposition" of synthesis.
 This presupposition of synthesis is an operative element that
 cannot be reduced further. When Luhmann describes the auto-
 poiesis of social systems in communication, he appeals to such an
 "undecomposable unit" upon which, at every moment, in every
 linkage or articulation, the system depends. This unit, for commu-
 nication, is the "synthesis of information, utterance and under-
 standing" ("Autopoiesis" 4), a synthesis that is "operative": "As an
 operating unit it is undecomposable, doing its autopoietic work
 only as an element in the system" (4). At the same time, because
 we are here dealing with a meaning-based system that can "re-
 enter" its own constitutive distinction from the environment within
 its system, communication can only "observe" itself, "re-enter" or
 recur, by disarticulating this very distinction:
 It is forced by its own structure to separate and to recombine
 hetero-referentiality and self-referentiality. Referring to itself,
 the process has to distinguish information and utterance and
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 to indicate which side of the distinction is supposed to serve
 as the base for further reference. Therefore, self-reference is
 nothing but reference to this distinction between hetero-
 reference and self-reference. (4)
 That is, communication's self-reference and psychic self-reference
 (here considered as the perception of the difference between infor-
 mation and utterance considered above) are one and the same,
 considered from the vantage of their results. Just as much as psy-
 chic systems, the self-reference of the communication system only
 takes place by the insistent disarticulation of selves and reference,
 bodies and language, or in Luhmann's terms, psychic and social
 systems. But with each new disarticulation, the fiction of the syn-
 thesis of self- and hetero-reference must be "presupposed" anew.
 The working of self-reference, its essential differentiating move-
 ment, requires at every moment a mirage of identity from which
 to distinguish itself, a synthesis to cancel and disarticulate. Every
 observation proceeds only on the back of the presupposition of
 a prior, "blind" operation. (Luhmann asserts unambiguously that
 "operations of the mind and of communication proceed blindly"
 ["How Can the Mind Participate?" 382].) The figure of observation
 requires then, for its very existence, the concept of blind opera-
 tion. In the "construction of an observer," of the blind, helpless,
 fascinated gaze of a deluded psychic system, the communication
 system secures its own operational closure by imagining it has suc-
 cessfully located its own environment. And the same holds for
 those perceiving psychic systems forever differentiating themselves
 through reference to the distinction between communicative be-
 haviors and mere information.
 What Luhmann's theory allows us to say is that meaning-
 systems require the alibi of identity in order to keep going. This
 identity is an always presupposed, because always already undone,
 synthesis "blind" to its own internal rupture or constitutive differ-
 ence. In pointing out this rupture and this blindness, "obser-
 vation" creates the necessary next fiction of "operation." The
 problem is that this "observation" cannot but presuppose the
 "operation," and in positing a blinded observer-say, a psychic sys-
 tem deluded about its ability to communicate-the observing sys-
 tem merely regards itself in the mirror without recognizing that
 fact. Insofar as both psychic and social are essentially meaning-
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 based systems with the ability to "re-enter" their own constitutive
 distinction, their "interpenetration" is precisely their simultaneous
 operation, as each observes its self-distinction and thus presup-
 poses the necessary operation in the other. They are inextricably
 joined in their inability to proceed without constantly disarticu-
 lating one from another, self- from hetero-reference. Their essen-
 tial unity lies in their paradoxical operational commitment to
 "closure." Because "identity" is a problem for them, because they
 cannot achieve identity otherwise than differentially, theirs is a
 symbiotic antagonism; each functions as the operation for the
 other's observation, the alibi of an environment for the other's
 system.
 But in a swerve that should no longer be surprising, these
 observational paradoxes are reformulated, or recoded, by Luh-
 mann as temporal predicaments.7 The structure I have just been
 describing, in which the "continuing dissolution of the system
 becomes a necessary cause of its autopoietic reproduction" ("Auto-
 poeisis" 9), is described in temporal terms when Luhmann writes
 that "conscious systems and social systems have to produce their
 own decay," that they must "produce their basic elements ... not
 as short-term states but as events that vanish as soon as they ap-
 pear" (9). These events serve as another version of the "presup-
 posed synthesis" allowing for autopoiesis, and thus retain a maxi-
 mum of paradoxicality:
 Events can be identified and observed, anticipated and re-
 membered only as such a difference. Their identity is differ-
 ence. Their presence is a copresence of the before and the
 thereafter. They have to present time within time and have to
 reconstruct time within a shifting presence. ("Autopoiesis" 11)
 Such a presentation of "time within time" cannot do otherwise
 than solder the gap between synchrony and diachrony; it is the
 very inextricability of the psychic and the social, articulated in
 meaning, an inextricability whose "identity is difference," that dic-
 tates such a temporal suspension of "time within time." For the
 same reason, the spatial predicament bequeathed by the epistemo-
 logical concerns of the human sciences-the predicament of ob-
 servers both outside and inside that which is observed-is charac-
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 terized by the observation of observation. Formally speaking,
 observation and the event are versions of each other; just as obser-
 vation introduces a wedge between the operation "before" (the one
 being distinguished, rendered visible), and the one to come "there-
 after" (that is, the one inaugurated anew with the observing dis-
 tinction, but which has no present existence for that observation),
 so the event self-consumes in coming to be, is only its unenduring
 distinctiveness vis-a-vis its past and its future. If the observer ap-
 pears as his own blindness, that can also be described as the event
 which appears in its own surpassing. The interpenetration be-
 tween the spatial (observation) and the temporal (event) descrip-
 tions is frankly recognized by Luhmann: "If autopoiesis bases itself
 on events, a description of the system needs not only one, but two
 dichotomies: the dichotomy of system and environment and the
 dichotomy of event and situation" (10).
 I reintroduce the term "interpenetration" in the last sentence
 advisedly. For it seems to me that here, with the recoding of obser-
 vational paradoxes as temporal ones, we reach the furthest limit
 of Luhmann's theoretical endeavor. The system for which such a
 temporal recoding is most important, even urgent, is not the psy-
 chic system, but rather the social system of communication intent
 on processing information. Jean-FranSois Lyotard has recently of-
 fered some intriguing commentary on what he characterizes as the
 accelerating expansion of a cosmic Leibnizian monad, a mathesis
 universalis governed by the "compulsion to communicate and to
 secure the communicability of anything at all" (62). For Lyotard,
 as for Luhmann, the efficiency of the communication system de-
 pends to a very large extent on the ability to present time within
 time, to process and manage the event:
 The importance of the technologies constructed around elec-
 tronics and information processing resides in the fact that they
 make the programming and control of memorizing, i.e. the
 synthesis of different times in one time, less dependent on
 the conditions of life on earth. It is very probable that among
 the material complexes we know, the human brain is the most
 capable of producing complexity in its turn, as the production
 of the new technologies proves. And as such, it also remains
 the supreme agency for controlling these technologies.
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 And yet its survival requires that it be fed by a body,
 which in turn can only survive in the conditions of life on
 earth, or a simulacrum of those conditions. I think that one of
 the essential objectives of research today is to overcome the
 obstacle that the body places in the way of the development of
 communicational technologies, i.e. the new extended mem-
 ory. (62)
 When Luhmann characterizes the paradoxes of the social system's
 autopoiesis as a "built-in requirement of discontinuity and new-
 ness" answering the system's "necessity to handle and process informa-
 tion" ("Autopoiesis" 10), he describes in his own terms what Lyotard
 calls the "compulsion to communicate." Social systems as commu-
 nication processors handle information; they reproduce them-
 selves via the constant rearticulation of the distinction between
 information and utterance, fact and behavior, themselves and psy-
 chic systems. Such a compulsion, we can see, cannot proceed oth-
 erwise than by constantly trying to overcome the obstacle of the
 body, and all the noninformational facets of meaning adhering to
 psychic and social behavior.
 I will return now to Foucault, who described two elements of
 the analytic of finitude within which we still operate. One was a
 visual or observational metaphor: "the blind stain" by which it is
 possible to know man as wedded to what he cannot see. The other
 was essentially temporal: as the locus of a temporal origin "always
 in recession to itself." From the perspective of the psychic system,
 the interpenetration of psychic and social-the expression each
 gives of the finitude of the other-is most powerfully expressed
 in the first, observational, metaphor. It is very hard not to place
 bodies and psyches at the root of all talk of observation. When
 the temporal paradox comes to the fore-as it does occasionally in
 Luhmann and Lyotard, for instance-I think we can see the other
 face of this interpenetration. For it is from the vantage of a truly
 supra-individual communication system that man's finitude-his
 very psycho-corporeal embeddedness-is best expressed not as
 the limit of vision, but as a temporal pulse. More and more, I sus-
 pect, we will watch man confront his own finitude not in the form
 of the mote in his eye, but as the moment that passes in the merest
 blink. More and more, the human seems less an observer coupled
This content downloaded from 129.79.32.58 on Mon, 27 Jan 2020 20:45:50 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Blinded Me with Science 135
 to his own blindness than a switch or relay who can be "on" only
 because it can just as well be "off." Our metaphors of communica-
 tion may be giving way to communication's metaphors of us.
 Notes
 1. See Hacking. Jacques Derrida has also taken up the interrelation between
 questions of human identity, conjecture, and probability in "Psyche: Inventions
 of the Other."
 2. The list of lectures is given in Seminar, Book II 294.
 3. The first of these forms would be the "impersonal subject," which is ex-
 pressed in the "one" of the "one knows that ... ," and which "gives merely the
 general form of the noetic subject" ("Le Temps logique" 207). "The second, which
 is expressed in 'the two whites' who must recognize themselves 'in each other,'
 introduces the form of the other as such, that is as pure reciprocity" (208).
 4. See "The Paradoxy of Observing Systems" in a forthcoming issue of this
 journal. Speaking of the endless way in which, with each observation, a new un-
 marked space is at once "severed" and (re)-created, Luhmann comments drily:
 "We resist the temptation to call this creation."
 5. For a clear and up-to-date summary of Luhmann's theory, see "Systems
 Theory According to Niklas Luhmann" in this issue.
 6. As Habermas has remarked, this theoretical itinerary, precisely in its hostil-
 ity to the philosophical tradition of the subject of reflection, situates itself as much
 in that very tradition as anywhere else:
 It is not so much the disciplinary tradition of social theory from
 Comte to Parsons that Luhmann tries to connect up with, as the his-
 tory of problems associated with the philosophy of the subject from
 Kant to Husserl. His systems theory does not, say, lead sociology onto
 the secure path of science; rather it presents itself as the successor to
 an abandoned philosophy. (368)
 7. For a subtle consideration of the issue of temporality in Luhmann's work,
 especially as it relates to deconstructive thought on time, see Cornell.
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